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Abstract We consider a reinforcement learning setting where the learner is given
a set of possible models containing the true model. While there are algorithms that
are able to successfully learn optimal behavior in this setting, they do so without
trying to identify the underlying true model. Indeed, we show that there are cases in
which the attempt to find the true model is doomed to failure.
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Introduction
In reinforcement learning problems, an agent acts in an unknown environment that
allows the agent to take actions that are followed by a response of the environment.
The paradigm for representing such reinforcement learning problems are Markov
decision processes, where starting in some initial state s1, the agent at time steps
t ¼ 1; 2; . . . chooses an action at from a set of actions A, obtains a random reward
depending on the current state st and the chosen action at, and then moves to state
stþ1 according to transition probabilities that also depend on the state-action pair
ðst; atÞ. Formally, a Markov decision process is defined as follows.
Definition 1 AMarkov decision process (MDP)M consists of a set of states S with
some distinguished initial state s1, a set of actions A, reward distributions with mean
r(s, a) for the reward when choosing action a in state s, and transition probabilities
pðs0js; aÞ for the probability of moving to state s0 when choosing action a in state s.
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However, in many practical reinforcement learning problems (e.g. applications in
robotics) the underlying state space can either be huge or even unknown. Thus, a
chess playing robot may be confronted with the same board position on two
different occasions, but the respective video signals of the board may be different.
Thus, it makes sense to distinguish between observations and states. In more
complex scenarios as we will consider here, the agent only has direct access to
observations (like the video signal of the robot) but has no information about the
underlying state (the respective board position). In the motivating example, states
could be considered as sets of observations (corresponding to the same state), or
equivalently, mappings from the set of observations O to a state space S. Without
prior knowledge the agent has to consider various such models that map
observations to states. In our example, the true model would map all images
showing the same board position to the same state, but of course when learning from
scratch it is not clear that this is the correct model. Rather, it seems that the learner
has to learn the true model or a good approximation of it as well. Actually, we will
consider more general models that need not aggregate observations but more
generally histories, that is, the sequences of observations, rewards, and chosen
actions. This notion of models has been introduced by Hutter (2009).
Definition 1 In a reinforcement learning problem, the history ht after t time steps
is the sequence ht :¼ o1; a1; r1; o2; a2; r2; . . .; at; rt; otþ1 of observations os 2 O,
collected rewards rs 2 R, and chosen actions as 2 A at time steps s ¼ 1; . . .; t.
Definition 2 A model / : H ! S/ is a mapping from the set of histories H to the
state space S/ (under /) and maps each history h 2 H to a state /ðhÞ in the state
space S/.
That is, similar to our motivating example, a model assigns a respective state to
each situation in which the agent can find himself in (i.e., a history). In the example of
the chess playing robot, the observation of the board is actually not always sufficient
to decide whose move it is, and one has to take into account also the recent history of
observations to determine the correct state of the game. Note that the notion of model
in Definition 2 is still rather modest, as we do not demand that a model also specifies
the precise values of the mean rewards and transition probabilities of all state-action
pairs, which would make things obviously much harder.
Now, we assume that there is a true model utrue that maps histories to states with
respect to which the environment behaves like a Markov decision process.1
However, this model is unknown to the learner. Rather, the learner has a set of
possible models U, each mapping histories to states, at her disposal which we
assume to contain the true model utrue.
In this paper we are interested in the following questions: Is it possible to identify
the true model? Can an agent learn to behave optimally in the underlying true
Markov decision process? Is the identification of the true model a necessary
prerequisite for optimal behavior? Surprisingly, it turns out that not only is the
1 Note that the crucial property of an MDP is itsMarkovian behavior, that is, rewards and transitions only
depend on the current state and not on the history.
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answer to the latter question negative, in general it is not possible to identify the true
model, while it is still possible to learn optimal behavior.
Learning Optimal Behavior is Possible (and Not Much More Difficult
than in the MDP Setting)
MDP Preliminaries
We are interested in learning optimal behavior in the setting introduced in the
previous section, competing with an optimal strategy that maximizes the collected
rewards. Before making this more precise, we will introduce some assumptions
concerning the formal framework. First, in the following we assume that the random
rewards are bounded. Intuitively, if we allowed rewards to be unbounded, any
learning algorithm may miss a very large reward at a particular time step, a loss
which it may not be able to recover anymore. For the sake of simplicity we assume
the rewards to be bounded in the unit interval [0, 1], which can be easily achieved
by rescaling the rewards in a suitable way.
Further, while there are a few theoretical results for reinforcement learning in
MDPs with infinite state space under some additional assumptions (see e.g. Ortner
and Ryabko 2012; Lakshmanan et al. 2015), we also assume that the state space and
the action space are finite. Note however, that the set of observations is allowed to
be infinite, and it may well be that the learner sees no observation twice.
We continue with some preliminary theory on Markov decision processes, see
e.g. (Puterman 1994). A (stationary) policy on an MDP M fixes for each state a
respective action, that is, it is a mapping p : S! A. The average reward of such a
policy p is defined as











where st denotes the random state that is visited at step t when choosing actions
according to policy p. An optimal policy p on M maximizes the average reward,
that is, qðM; pÞ  qðM; pÞ for all policies p. It can be shown that the average
reward cannot be increased by using non-stationary policies (that may choose
different actions when visiting the same state on different time steps), so that the
restriction to stationary policies in the definition of p is justified. However, a
learning algorithm may still perform optimally employing a nonstationary policy.
Now, by learning optimal behavior in an MDP, we mean that an agent operating on
an MDP succeeds in converging to an optimal (possibly nonstationary) policy that
maximizes the average reward.
Learning Optimal Behavior in MDPs
There are several algorithms such as E3 (Kearns and Singh 2002), R-max (Brafman
and Tennenholtz 2002), or UCRL (Jaksch et al. 2010) that are able to learn optimal
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behavior in an MDP setting when the learner only has knowledge of the state and
action space of the underlying MDP. The E3 algorithm (E3 stands for ‘‘explicit
explore or exploit’’) maintains a partial model2 of the underlying MDP and plays an
exploration strategy in states that are not sufficiently known, while exploiting (i.e.,
playing the optimal policy in the estimated model) in known states. R-max and
UCRL are based on the idea of ‘‘optimism in the face of uncertainty’’. Thus, R-max
maintains a model in which all states that have not been visited sufficiently often
have maximal possible reward (hence the name ‘‘R-max’’) and plays the optimal
policy in this model. The UCRL algorithm refines this idea by using confidence
intervals for rewards and transition probabilities and assuming the most optimistic
parameters3 in these confidence intervals. Again, the algorithm then chooses the
optimal policy based on this optimistic model of the MDP.4
The theoretical results for these algorithms go beyond simple convergence to an
optimal policy for time T !1. Indeed, for all the mentioned algorithms there are
also guarantees on their finite-time behavior. Thus, the sample-complexity bounds
for E3 (Kearns and Singh 2002) and R-max (Brafman and Tennenholtz 2002) give
bounds on the number of time steps after which the algorithm is probably
approximately correct (PAC), that is, close to optimal with high probability.5 For
UCRL there are even bounds on the regret the algorithm suffers with respect to an
optimal policy after any T steps. More precisely, the regret of an algorithm is
defined as follows.
Definition 3 The regret of an algorithm in an MDP M after T steps is defined as
the difference between the total reward of an optimal policy and the accumulated
reward of the algorithm, that is,




where rt is the (random) reward obtained by the algorithm at step t.
For the UCRL algorithm it was shown (Jaksch et al. 2010) that the regret after




(ignoring parameters of the
MDP that also appear in the bound6), that is, the per-step regret of UCRL converges
to 0 at a rate of 1ﬃﬃ
T
p .
2 In this section, model is not used in the sense of Definition 2 but rather refers to a model of the
underlying MDP based on the estimates for rewards and transition probabilities so far.
3 That is, those parameters that maximize the optimal average reward.
4 For more discussion of the concept of ‘‘optimism in the face of uncertainty’’ and its limits see (Ortner
2008).
5 Such PAC bounds also exist in other learning settings, cf. the discussion in Sect. 4 below.
6 These other parameters are the size of the state and the action space as well as the diameter, the largest
expected time it takes to reach any state from some other state. The appearance of these parameters in the
bound has also been shown to be necessary. For details see (Jaksch et al. 2010).
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Reinforcement Learning with Model Selection
The question of learning optimal behavior in the model selection setting introduced
in Sect. 1 was first considered by Hutter (2009). A bit later, Maillard et al. (2012)
gave the first regret bounds in this setting. Using the UCRL algorithm as a
subroutine, the suggested BLB algorithm computes confidence intervals for the
regret of each model, and chooses the model for which the lower value of the
confidence interval is maximal (accordingly, BLB stands for ‘‘best lower bound’’).






(again disregarding other parameters than T). Although learning in the
model selection setting looks more difficult, as the learner seems to have the
additional task of identifying the right model, recently an algorithm was presented




as UCRL in the MDP
setting.7 This algorithm (called OMS for ‘‘optimistic model selection’’) actually
does not try to identify the true model, but chooses the model on an optimistic basis
(just like the UCRL algorithm in the MDP case). That is, OMS chooses the model
which promises the highest reward (based on the estimates so far). Even if a non-
Markov model is chosen, the algorithm compares the collected rewards to a
respective (fictitious) Markov model. The model is rejected if it performs below the
threshold determined by this Markov model. In particular, this means that the
algorithm is willing to act according to a wrong non-Markov model as long as the
rewards collected under this model are high enough, that is, are indistinguishable
from the rewards a Markov model would give. Thus, the truth of the applied model
is not important for the algorithm.
Finding the True Model May be Impossible
The question of identifying the true model in a similar setting as considered here has
already been investigated by Hallak et al. (2013).8 It is shown that under certain
assumptions the true model indeed can be identified in the long run. However, the
assumptions made by Hallak et al. (2013) are so strong that they will be satisfied
only in a small fraction of learning problems and rarely hold in applications. Thus,
on one hand it is assumed that all state-action pairs are visited infinitely often when
time T !1, on the other hand, the policy applied shall be constant. Thus, the
existence of an ergodic policy is assumed. Such ergodic policies however do not
even exist in simple scenarios such as when all transitions are deterministic. On the
7 While the dependence on the horizon T of these bounds is the same as in the MDP setting, the
dependence on the other parameters is worse than in the MDP case. In particular, the bounds of Maillard
et al. (2012) depend on the size of the state spaces of all the models. An improved bound has recently
been achieved by Ortner et al. (2014). However, this new bound has worse dependence on the size of the
state space and the diameter of the true model, too. Also the number of models given to the learner
appears in the bound. Unlike in the MDP setting, it is still an open problem which of these parameters
necessarily have to appear in any regret bound.
8 The main difference is that models in (Hallak et al. 2013) map observations (instead of histories) to
states.
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other hand, even if ergodic policies exist, without knowing the correct model in
advance it is not clear that such a policy can be identified. Moreover, it is assumed
that each observation has only one possible predecessor state, and that the models
given to the learner are hierarchical, that is, the models /1; . . .;/n given to the
learner are such that each /i is a refinement
9 of all models /j with j\i. Obviously,
the latter restriction on the model structure is particularly strong.
The following example, violating the condition of hierarchical models, shows
that identification of the true model is not always possible.
Example 1 Assume a model selection problem where the learner is given four
models /1, /2, /3, /4. The action set contains two actions a1, a2, and the first
observation made by the learner is o1. Assume that /1 and /2 coincide on all
histories (that is, map all histories to the same state) except the history o1a2, which
is mapped to different states under /1 and /2. Also assume that /3 and /4 coincide
on all histories except the history o1a1.
Then, if the learner chooses a1 as her first action, obviously it is not possible to
decide between the models /1 and /2, as the only history where the two models
differ never appears. Similarly, if the learner first chooses a2, she cannot decide
between the models /3 and /4. Consequently, independent of which action the
learner chooses there are two indistinguishable models. Since each of the models
can be made to be the true model, the example shows that there are learning
problems in which it is impossible to identify the true model.
While Example 1 gives an extreme case, it is easy to weaken it. Indeed,
whenever two models differ from each other on sufficiently few histories, no
statistical test will be able to distinguish them, even if—unlike in Example 1—the
respective histories are observed by the learner.
Even in more convenient settings where models differ more strongly, the
identification of the true model constitutes a difficult problem: The learner has to
determine whether samples collected in the same state (according to some model)
and given an action are really generated by the same process. Similar problems have
been e.g. considered by Navarro et al. (2004) or Wagenmakers et al. (2004), cf. also
the discussion in Sect. 4.2 below.
Discussion
Other Notions of Learning
It is important to note the difference between the reinforcement learning setting we
consider and other learning scenarios that appear in the machine learning literature.
Historically, the first formal setting for learning—introduced by Gold (1967)—was
that of learning recursive functions from their graphs. In this setting, different
9 Here, a model / is a refinement of a model /0 if for all observations o1; o2 it holds that /ðo1Þ ¼ /ðo2Þ
implies that /0ðo1Þ ¼ /0ðo2Þ. Intuitively, this means that if / maps two observations to the same state,
these observations have to correspond to the same state in the less refined model as well.
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notions of learning in the limit have been considered (cf. e.g. Case and Smith
(1983)) that imply different classes of recursive functions that turn out to be
learnable. An overview of this field, also known as inductive inference, has been
given by Angluin and Smith (1983).
Later, classification problems such as introduced in the formal setting of concept
learning by Valiant (1984) became increasingly important. Given a set X and a set
of concepts C  2X , the learner has the task to identify a target concept10 C 2 C by
evaluating training examples x 2 X (picked according to some probability
distribution over X) together with a corresponding label, indicating whether x is
contained in the target concept C. So-called PAC bounds give theoretical bounds
on the number of such training examples necessary to identify the target concept
probably approximately correct. For an overview of such results for different
concept classes see Angluin (1992). For practical purposes, there is a wide range of
algorithms for classification tasks available (like neural networks, decision trees, or
support vector machines) some of which also come with theoretical guarantees in
form of PAC bounds. Boosting approaches that combine several weak learners (i.e.,
learners that are only a bit better than random guessing) to achieve PAC learnability
(Freund and Schapire 1997) are of particular theoretical interest in our context, as
there are no similar techniques in reinforcement learning.
Note that both of the mentioned learning scenarios already pursue more modest
aims than identifying an underlying truth in finite time. While inductive inference is
interested in learning in the limit, in concept learning one is happy with an
approximation of the target concept.
Comparing these settings to our reinforcement learning scenario, the latter
corresponds to a multiclass classification11 task for which PAC bounds have been
derived by Morvant et al. (2012)): Each history is assigned to one (unique)
corresponding state. Actually, there are indeed results about reduction of
performance in reinforcement learning problems to performance in (a sequence
of) classification tasks (Langford and Zadrozny 2005).12 However, while error rates
for classification tasks in this framework can be translated into regret bounds, this
does not give a concrete algorithm. In particular, it is not clear how to construct
training sets for the respective classifiers. For a detailed discussion of the subtleties
of the reduction see (Langford and Zadrozny 2005).
Generally, compared to other machine learning settings like classification, in
reinforcement learning there is the additional level of acting, with respect to which
performance is measured. It is indeed a characteristic of reinforcement learning that
a high probability identification (or approximation) of the underlying truth is no
guarantee for high performance with respect to reward. Thus, after having identified
the underlying true model after a certain number of steps with error probability
10 The target concept can be e.g. considered to be the set of instances with a certain property.
11 Unlike in binary classification where examples are assigned one of two possible labels (indicating the
membership in the target concept), in multiclass classification there are in general more than two labels.
Still, each example is assigned a unique label.
12 The idea here is however to label the histories not by the respective underlying state but by the
respective optimal action.
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d[ 0, it is still risky to act according to this model for the rest of the time, as with
probability d the model will be wrong and the chosen policy suboptimal. This
problem is known as the ‘‘exploration vs exploitation dilemma’’, which is already
present in very simple reinforcement learning settings, such as the multi-armed
bandit problem (Lai and Robbins 1985; Auer et al. 2002), which corresponds to a
one-state MDP (with obviously trivial transition probabilities).
On the other hand, a model that achieves small regret need not be a good
approximation of the underlying true model. As already indicated in Sect. 2.3, the
OMS algorithm of Maillard et al. (2013) does not even try to identify or
approximate the true model. Even after a large number of steps it would not be able
to tell which model would give a good approximation of the true model.
Different Notions of Model
That an algorithm can be successful without trying to identify the underlying model
may be reminiscent of the discussion of Breiman (2001) about the two cultures in
statistical modeling: while the traditional statistics community tends to assume an
underlying (type of) model for observed data (so that only the parameters of the
model have to be estimated), the machine learning community tries to solve
problems algorithmically without explicitly assuming any underlying (true) model.
However, there are some notable differences to this classical setting: Most
importantly, the notion of model Breiman (2001) uses is different from ours and
rather means a stochastic data model that has generated the observed data. In our
context, this rather corresponds to the underlying Markov decision process. The
assumption that a reinforcement learning agent acts in an unknown Markov decision
process is actually more in the tradition of the first culture criticized by Breiman
(2001). Still, Markov decision processes are a paradigm in reinforcement learning
that has seen few alternatives.13 Also, our assumption that the learner has access to a
set of possible models containing the true model, rather corresponds to the culture
that is criticized by Breiman (2001). It is still an open problem how to come up with
an algorithm that either produces its models automatically or does not need any
explicit models at all. As has been shown recently by Ortner et al. (2014), the
assumption that the true model is part of the considered model can be relaxed if one
is happy to compete with an approximate model. However, this does not imply
convergence to the optimal policy (in the true model).
A related question is that of model mimicry. Thus, a different model than the true
one may lead to comparably high reward even though it is not the true model
(similar to Example 1). This has been discussed for statistical data models e.g. by
Navarro et al. (2004) or Wagenmakers et al. (2004), where it is suggested to
account for the potential of one model to imitate another one and how to measure
this model mimicry. However, while Navarro et al. (2004) and Wagenmakers et al.
(2004) try to identify the true data-generating model, in the reinforcement learning
13 Other popular settings like predictive state-representations (Littman et al. 2002) or partially observable
Markov decision processes (POMDPs) (Kaelbling et al. 1998) are rather extensions of the standard MDP
setting than completely independent approaches.
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context this is not important as we are happy with low regret, independent of
whether the model employed by the algorithm is the true one.
Conclusion
In the considered reinforcement learning setting, it may be arguable that in cases as
the one in Example 1 the question about the true model does not make sense. While
we would not go as far as claiming that the concept of truth is meaningless here, in
the context of reinforcement learning, truth is at least subordinate to other criteria
like regret. One could interpret the situation in the sense of William James’
pragmatic theory of truth. The learner may consistently employ incorrect models
which are however earning high reward. These models may be wrong from the
perspective of an omniscient observer, however from the view of the learning agent
they fit James’ dictum quite well:
Ideas ... become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory
relations with other parts of our experience (James 1907, p. 44).
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